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regardless of the economic downturn [2]. Offshoring tasks or
entire processes are not new phenomena. Already in the early 90s
it became popular with Kodak shifting the operation of its
information center to a global provider which was partly located
in India [4, 5].

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates changes in the variety and intensity of
formal and informal control mechanisms in offshore software
development (OSD) projects. Based on a comparative case study
approach our results confirm existing findings such as that the
amount of control varies across different projects stages, but also
contribute with new findings. For example, we found that
particularly the quality of project deliverables in early project
phases will lead to an increase of the amount of formal control.
However, these quality problems do not necessarily lead to an
increase of informal control. In return, an increase in quality of
deliverables will subsequently decrease the amount of control. An
important finding is that in contrast to prior studies our results do
not support that the amount of control is directly related to project
success. Altogether, our study contributes to the further
understanding of the dynamics of the amount of control, its
influencing factors and its relationship to project success.

This paper focuses on offshore software development (OSD),
which is defined as the design, development and testing of
software by a supplying organization located in a foreign, lowcost country. Nowadays, OSD is widely conducted, not only by
Fortune 1000 companies. This has several reasons such as cost
benefits, flexibility gains [6], increased project management and
process quality by OSD providers [7]. While OSD offers a lot of
opportunities and benefits, it also poses some specific challenges.
Compared to in-house or domestically outsourced projects,
offshore software projects are more prone to failure [8]. Apart
from traditional software project risks, OSD is exposed to
additional risks caused by language and cultural differences [9,
10, 11], geographic distance [9, 12, 13], knowledge transfer
difficulties [14, 15, 16], and challenges with regard to control and
coordination [17, 18, 19].

Keywords

One approach for managing risks associated with OSD is the
exercise of control. The OSD context imposes several unique
challenges in terms of how the client monitors, evaluates, and
rewards or sanctions the supplier [20, 21]. Due to differences in
cultures and goals, both client and supplier are strongly influenced
by opportunistic behavior of the project partner [22]. For instance,
on the one hand, the client may be worried about the supplier
delivering inadequate software quality and thus may try to
increase control. On the other hand, the supplier may fear that the
client will change requirements late in the project. Moreover,
some clients prefer interpersonal interactions which the supplier
may regard as too costly and restrictive. Differences in
perspectives like those described may cause the two companies to
drag project control in different directions [23]. Furthermore,
geographical distance further complicates control. It limits the
ability of both parties to meet on a regular basis. As a result,
receiving regular feedback and socializing to build up and
maintain interpersonal relationships is difficult. To summarize,
finding the right balance out of a variety of different control
mechanisms and ‗customizing‘ these mechanisms to the specific
project context remain among the biggest OSD challenges.

Offshore Software Development, Control Theory, Offshoring,
Dynamics of Control, Amount of Control

1. INTRODUCTION
Offshoring of tasks or processes is among the most discussed
topics in both practitioner and academic literature [1]. In past
years, the offshoring industry grew significantly to $ 80 billion in
2008 [2]. It is predicted that this growth will continue in the next
five years by a compound annual growth rate of around 6.4% [3],
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Previous research has mainly focused on the control variety and
intensity within portfolios of control – the amount of control [24,

424

25]. Prior research has also investigated the dynamics of control
in terms of how control changes across different project stages
[21, 25]. However, no research has tried to combine these two
streams of research, even though this has important implications
for managers of OSD projects, trying to exercise the right mix of
control mechanisms in each of the project phases.

In contrast to formal modes of control, which ignore selfregulating and interpersonal dynamics that influence behavior,
informal controls embrace social or people strategies [28, 29].
Informal controls consist of clan and self control. Clan control is
likened to the cohesive practices of a group and is typified by the
degree to which all members of a group are committed to
achieving group goals. Self control is solely reliant on an
individual‘s ability to monitor and control their own behaviors,
with appropriate rewards and sanctions as required.

Thus, this paper tries to address this gap by investigating the
changes in the variety and intensity of formal and informal control
mechanisms across different phases of OSD projects. In
particular, the paper tries to identify important factors that trigger
changes in the amount of control in different project phases.
Furthermore, these findings are linked to project success,
suggesting refining the relationship between amount of control
and success variables. Using a comparative case study approach,
we propose seven propositions refining the relationship between
the amount of control and its influencing factors across different
phases of control.

Various control mechanisms are available – some of them can
also be used for exercising more than one control mode.
Typically, the controller uses a portfolio of control consisting of
several control mechanisms of different control modes [27]. This
portfolio is subject to modifications and adoptions throughout the
entire project [20, 25], frequently referred to as the dynamics of
control [24, 25].

2.2 Amount of Control

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This paper adopts Rustagi et al.‘s notion of the amount of control.
They define the amount of control as ―the variety of mechanisms
used by a client to exercise control over a vendor and the extent to
which each of those mechanisms is used‖ [1, p. 129].
Consequently, it can be said that the amount of control consists of
the two determinants: variety and intensity.

2.1 Exercise of Control
In accordance with previous studies, this papers views control in a
behavioral sense, which means that the controllees are influenced
to act according to objectives and goals set by the controller [26].
This view is based on agency and organization theories and is
consistent with prior IS studies [20, 24, 25, 27].

Most previous research has only focused on the variety of control
mechanisms in offshored or outsourced software development
[24, 25]. However, particularly little effort was undertaken to
measure the variety per control mode as well as the control
intensity within a portfolio/mode. Here, clients usually have
mechanisms that they primarily rely on, whereas they use other
mechanisms as supplement [1]. Although previous studies found
empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between the
total amount of control and (project) performance [33, 34], there
is no recent research taking into account the more precise
definition of Rustagi et al.‘s notion of the amount of control.

Usually, a control situation involves an individual exercising
control (the controller) and an individual being controlled (the
controllee) [20]. However, this clear distinction becomes difficult
in the OSD context [25]. For instance, the controller and the
controllee may not be single individuals but teams of individuals
representing their organizational unit or organization respectively.
Furthermore, in an OSD project the supplier project manager may
be controlled by the client and, in turn, may control the supplier
project team members. Often, project managers prevent direct
contact to the supplier‘s project team making it difficult to directly
influence their behavior [20].
Category

Mode

Approach

Formal
control

Behavior

Definition and monitoring of the
process to achieve desired outputs

Outcome

Specification and measurement of
outputs (both interim and final)

Clan

Reliance on the group, or clan, to
monitor and control itself

Self

Reliance on the individuals to
monitor and control themselves

Informal
control

2.3 Dynamics of Control and Influencing
Factors
Dynamics of control describe how the used control mechanisms
change during the project. Choudhury and Sabherwal [25] and
Heiskanen et al. [30] explored those dynamics of control through
the lens of encounters and episodes. They distinguish between
stable, long periods—called episodes—and disrupting events
between those episodes—called encounters. For instance, in the
OSD context, the completion of the requirements specification
can be seen as such an encounter ending the episode of
requirement determination [25]. Kirsch [24] argues that
controllers usually build their starting control portfolio by
investigating what formal control mechanisms are available. Then
these control mechanisms are evaluated. As a result, suitable
mechanisms are kept, inadequate mechanisms dropped, or new
appropriate mechanisms added to the initial control portfolio.
Subsequent changes in control choices are then triggered by
factors in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts.

Table 1: Control modes
From a behavioral perspective four control modes can be
distinguished (see Table 1). These four control modes can be
grouped into formal and informal control modes. Formal control
can be viewed as a performance evaluation strategy [28] and are
split into behavior and outcome control. Behavior control is
exercised when procedures and rules that are applied are prespecified and if rewards are based on the extent to which the
controlee follows the procedures [26, 28]. Outcome control can be
exercised when targets or specific outcomes are specified and
when the controlee is rewarded for meeting these given goals.

While there is considerable prior research on the factors that
influence the exercise of control in general, there is only very little
on the factors influencing the amount of control, in particular
across different project phases. Typically, factors that influence
the general choice of control can be categorized into controller
and controllee [1, 26, 27, 28], project [20, 24, 25], relationship [4,
24, 25], and task characteristics [24, 26, 27, 43]. Factors in these
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categories (e.g., project-related knowledge, project performance,
project stage, resource availability, task complexity, and task
uncertainty) may also impact the amount of control exercised in
various project stages to various degrees, but still this has not been
sufficiently discussed in literature. So far, current research
indicates that the project stage would influence the choice of
control mechanisms [20, 25, 31]. Often, in some phases certain
mechanisms proof to be inefficient and are therefore removed.
Often, during later stages of the project other phase-specific
mechanisms are added (such as testing) [25]. Other authors [20,
25, 32] found a relation between project performance, control and
certain triggering factors. They note that decreasing project
performance, often represented by decreasing deliverable quality,
would lead to an increase in control. For instance, Sabherwal and
Choudhury [21, 25] state that behavior and clan control are
introduced or increased in certain phases if problems occur during
the project.

captive offshoring, meaning that the supplier is a legal entity of
the client. The other cases were about offshore outsourcing,
connoting that the project was either outsourced to a multinational
service provider with offshoring capabilities or a local vendor in
an offshore/nearshore country.

2.4 Project Success

3.2 Data Collection

Our study covers various project volumes, ranging from € 20.000
to more than € 100 million. A vast majority of the cases had a
total project volume of less than € 5 million. Half of the clients
negotiated time and material contracts. One client added a cap
limit to the contract to minimize possible additional costs. All
other clients had fixed price agreements with their vendors. The
offshore team size varied from 4 to over 300. However, around
half of the regarded projects involved less than 50 offshore
employees. The length of the projects ranged from 4 months for a
web-portal development to over 6 years for a SAP implementation
involving multiple rollouts in different locations. Five projects
had duration of less than 2 years.

Previous studies found empirical evidence that there is a positive
relationship between the total amount of control and (project)
performance [33, 34]. In the IS literature, two ways of measuring
project success are popular [35]. The first method is to measure
the extent to which the initial expectations are met. The second
method is to determine the level of overall satisfaction with the
offshoring agreement. This paper uses a mixture of both methods
considering several success variables, such as delivery in time,
project costs, project quality [36] and customer satisfaction with
the offshoring agreement [35].

Between February and April 2010, we interviewed 12 project and
program managers. The semi-structured interviews followed
Myers and Newman‘s guidelines for qualitative interviewing [39].
Due to the very large size of some projects, work stream leads
were interviewed as well. The average interviewee had almost
twelve years of IT working experience and around five years of
offshore experience. The interviews lasted between one and two
hours. Before the interviews, an interview guideline was sent to
all participants. This guideline contained definitions of control,
the research objectives and a set of sample questions. For
simplifying the analysis of the data, the authors introduced a
generic three phase project model consisting of the stages
requirements determination, system development and system
implementation. The interview partners were then asked how
control was carried out in each project phase. In order to avoid
interview bias, questions and the following discussions were
adapted to the interview partner‘s specific context and role. We
also interviewed multiple project team members in each case. This
helped in refining and validating the findings. In case of any
discrepancy in the statements or findings, they were solved
together with the interview partners.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to answer our research questions, we adopted a
comparative case study approach, guided by the process described
by Eisenhardt [37]. She draws from both interpretivists and
positivists in developing her theory-building process. Similar to
Kirsch‘s study on the dynamics of control [20], our research
approach was designed to investigate pre-identified constructs
from a positivist view as well as to surface new constructs in an
interpretive manner [20]. This hybrid approach can be
characterized as ―soft positivism‖ or ―scientific realism‖ [38].
Our rationale for selecting cases was based on purposeful
maximum sampling in order to show different perspectives on the
issue [44]. Therefore, our cases were heterogeneous in terms of
scope, clients, suppliers, and outsourcing locations. In particular,
cases were selected in which a significant number of employees
were located either offshore or nearshore. Such projects tend to be
particularly challenging for the project management, requiring a
wide range of control mechanisms. In order to allow for
comparison across cases only cases that followed a sequential
project phase methodology were selected. This resulted in a
selection of nine OSD project cases.

The interview itself was split into three parts. In the first part,
general information about the interview partner and the project
under study was gathered. The second part consisted of questions
regarding the variety of control mechanisms applied and the
intensity with which these mechanisms were exercised. For this
reason, a non exhaustive list of control mechanisms for each
control mode was used in the interviews. Here, the interviewee
was asked open questions regarding the mechanisms. Not yet
listed mechanisms were added to the list. After this open
discussion part, the interviewer asked specifically for the
remaining, not mentioned mechanisms in the list. The intensity
was determined by asking the interview partner which
mechanisms or modes were relatively important compared to
others. Sometimes a top list was compiled together with the
interviewee. Next, the influencing factors for the identified
amount of control were discussed. The third part consisted of
simple questions for evaluating the outcomes and the success of
the respective offshore software project.

3.1 Cases
A short description of each case including general information
about project volume, employees involved, outsourcing location,
etc. can be found in the appendix (Table 2) as well as the amount
of control in the corresponding project phases (Table 3).
About half of the cases included farshoring to countries in Asia
such as India. Two cases examined nearshoring arrangements to
Eastern European countries (Poland and Slovakia). The remaining
cases covered nearshoring projects in Africa or Western Europe
(e.g., Italy and Spain). One quarter of the projects involved

3.3 Data Analysis
For data analysis, the interviews were merged into nine case
summaries. These were then checked by the interview partners for
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correctness and completeness of the data. In order to avoid bias,
other project team members reviewed the case summary in most
cases. To achieve a more macro view on each case, we compared
across cases. The following steps were carried out:

consisting of requirements determination, the development and
the subsequent implementation phase [4]. The macro view on all
projects showed that the overall amount of control ranged from
low to very high. The breakdown of all amounts can be seen in the
appendix (see Table 3). Most projects used a rather high amount
of control.

Step 1: Identification of amount of control per project phase
In order to identify the amount of control per project phase, we
performed the following steps for each project and project phase:

4.1 Requirements Determination Phase

First, the mechanisms of each control mode were determined and
counted. The intensity of each control mode was estimated by
deriving it from the cases (from very low to very high). Second,
the variety of mechanisms was translated into a qualitative
variable (see scale above). Here, we went through all projects to
determine the maximum number of concurrently used
mechanisms within one control mode. For instance, the highest
number of mechanisms applied for outcome control was 10. Thus,
10 represented the highest achievable variety for this control
mode, 0 the lowest. This method was applied for the other control
modes as well. Third, by calculating the average between both
variables we derived the amount of control from the identified
mechanism variety and intensity. In cases where the amount was
in between two values, it was rounded up. The results were
verified by reviewing the cases again. Finally, the overall amount
of control was calculated by using the average of all control
modes. The overall amount of control was checked by again
comparing the result with the case description.

All project except C4 and C11 applied control mechanisms
already in the first project phase. The two exceptions had not yet
brought offshore employees into their projects due to trainings or
lack of need. C10 on the other hand, brought in their offshore
team in the middle of the requirements analysis phase.

Step 2: Identification of influencing factors

Behavior control was also exercised to a high extent. In four cases
the amount of control was high (C2, C3, and C6) to very high
(C7). In most of these cases team travelling communication
mechanisms were heavily used. In contrast, C8, C10 and C12 had
rather low amounts of behavior control in place, mainly because
the client was only able to directly influence the vendor
management but not the individuals, a phenomenon which
typically occur in OSD settings.

In particular, C2, C3, C6 and C7 used high amounts of outcome
control. In contrast, C8 and C10 applied only medium amounts of
control. C8‘s medium outcome control was the result of the
vendor not thoroughly reviewing the results in that phase. C10
brought in the offshore team after half of the phase, when a lot of
work had already been conducted. All sequential projects used
project plans with deadlines and milestones. Other popular
mechanisms included reviewing deliverables, controlling the
client‘s prototypes, preliminary deliverables and functional
specifications. This finding supports Choudhury and Sabherwal
[25] findings that control portfolios in outsourced software
projects are dominated by outcome control, especially in the
beginning of the project.

During the interviews, we asked about changes in control
mechanisms and intensities in all project phases. We also asked if
there were any concerns regarding too much or too little control
exercised by the client. In addition, with the help of the
interviewee we identified disrupting events or changing external
or internal influences in the projects. This helped identifying
influencing factors for the dynamics of control.

The amount of clan control varied significantly in the cases. On
the one hand, projects such as C2, C3 and C7 utilized a broad
range of clan control mechanisms. Temporary co-location was
one of the key factors for these high amounts of clan control. On
the other hand, other projects such as C6, C10 and C12 neglected
clan control in the first phase. Reasons for this varied: in C6, for
example, client and offshore teams were brought together later in
the project; in C12 the project managers thought that clan controls
were not necessary or even inefficient in this phase; and finally in
C10 the vendor tried to hide the project staff behind anonymous
services.

This procedure was followed for each of the project phases,
enabling us to examine changes across different project phases.
The factors influencing the amount of control were determined by
analyzing answers to the open questions posed during the
interviews. After a couple of interviews, the common drivers for
the control amounts emerged and the open questioning was
extended by direct questions regarding specific influencing
factors.
Step 3: Drawing conclusions
In order to draw conclusions, the findings had to be aggregated on
the case level. This was done with the help of overview charts. By
examining these overview charts, patterns shared by the projects
were identified. In addition, project characteristics and the
information gathered during the interviews were used for
explaining the control changes during the project. We also
identified cross-case patterns, investigated salient features in the
case descriptions, and tried to explain possible (statistical) outliers
by using available case data. Finally, data on project success was
mapped to the amount of control. All findings were subsequently
compared with previous research in order to draw final
conclusions and explain the findings.

The amount of self control ranged from very high (C7) to very
low (C10 and C12). In general, self control was the least used
control mode. The data did not indicate a link to project size,
strategic importance or any other variable, thus suggesting other
factors being important predictors of self control. For example
data from C7 shows that the high amount of informal control, in
particular self control was strongly influenced by experiences
gathered from prior OSD projects. In C10 the project manager had
bad experiences in using informal control, so the project setup did
not plan for these kinds of controls.

4.2 System Development Phase

4. AMOUNT OF CONTROL ACROSS
PROJECT PHASES

In the system development phase, all projects utilized the near/offshore resources for software development tasks. This phase
was characterized by an increase of the amount of control.

Similar to prior research to map control to project phases a very
generic three phase software project approach was used,
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As in the previous phase, outcome control remained the most
important control mode. Moreover, in five of nine cases, the
amount of outcome control was enhanced compared to the
requirements determination phase (e.g. C2, C6, C7, C8 and C10).
In the rest of the cases, the amount stayed on the same levels as in
the previous phase. This increase is the result of new outcome
control mechanisms being added to the existing portfolio. For
instance testing, code reviews etc. supplemented existing outcome
controls (see section 5). Another reason is that some projects ran
into problems requiring an increase in outcome control.

reason, during this phase they were still involved to a higher
degree.
Self control was not reduced as strongly as the other control
modes. It was solely reduced in C11 due to less team travelling
and socializing. This can also be explained by the rather low level
of self control in most projects throughout all phases.

5. DISCUSSION – INFLUENCING
FACTORS
What are the factors behind the changes in variety and intensity of
formal and informal control mechanisms across different phases
of OSD projects? This was the second part of the research
question posed at the beginning of the paper. The changing
amount of control during the project can only partly be explained
by the changing needs in each phase [e.g. 20, 40, 31]. In addition,
the global context and the influences of involved stakeholders
require alterations of the amounts of control during these phases.
Further explanations and refinements are consolidated into the
following propositions:

The amount of behavior control increased in this phase as well. In
C2, C6, C8 and C10 for instance, it increased, whereas it stayed
on the same level in the other cases. Team travelling and intense
communication were the drivers for this increase. In C4 and C11
exercising behavior control was difficult, because of the vendor
trying to inhibit direct influence and monitoring of behavior.
However, behavior control was still the second most popular
control mode and our data shows a moderate increase of the
amount of behavior control. This confirms Choudhury and
Sabherwal‘s [25] findings that behavior control mechanisms are
often added later in the project. For instance in C6 intense
communication and collaboration also intensified the amount of
behavior control, exercised by mechanisms such as imposing
procedures guiding programming, documenting and testing.

Proposition 1: Intensive testing leads to an increase of the
amount of formal control
In the system development phase intensive testing took place. In
six of nine projects, testing mechanisms, code reviews or the joint
specification test cases were added with high intensity to the
formal control portfolio (C2, C3, C6, C7, C10 and C11). For
instance, in C10 a wide range of testing mechanisms was
introduced, such as regular reviews of test plans, actual module
and functional tests. These mechanisms were not necessary in the
first phase. In C6 an automated testing system was used for
assembly and module tests. During the night, this tool tested
previously checked-in code. If errors occurred, the responsible
person was notified by the system about errors or warnings. Most
of these newly introduced mechanisms were dropped in the
following phase, because they were not required for the user
acceptance or functional system test, some others continued, such
as the manual user interface test (C7).

Clan control increased in three of nine projects (C6, C8 and C10).
This was caused by intensified team travelling during system
development. In C7 the amount of clan control decreased, because
the co-location was abandoned due to cost reasons. In C4 and C11
the offshore sources had just been added to the project. Due to the
vendor preventing direct contact, the amount of clan control was
rather low in these two projects.
Self control only increased in two projects (and decreased in one
project). The overall amount remained low compared to the other
control modes. In the other projects it remained untouched.

4.3 System Implementation Phase
In the system implementation, some projects (e.g. C6 and C8)
slowly pulled out their offshore teams. No data on this phase was
available in C2, because the project had not yet started with
system implementation.

Proposition 2: High communication intensity in the systems
development phase leads to an increase of the amount of clan
control
Compared to other phases we observed a relatively high amount
of clan control in the development phase. In three out of nine
projects it increased. A possible explanation might be the high
communication intensity in this phase, as evidenced in C6, C7 and
C8. For instance, in C6 communication increased as the
relationship between the client and vendor teams became closer
(see also proposition 4). Another possible explanation is that
cultural differences typically emerge in phases with high
communication needs, such as the systems development phase.
These can be facilitated by the use of informal controls [20].

In three cases the amount of outcome control was reduced (C7,
C10 and C11). In all other projects, the amount of control
remained on a similar level. This may be explained by the
removal of several outcome based controls initialized in the
previous phase. For instance, in C11 extensive testing was
abandoned, resulting in a lesser amount of control. In C7 on the
other hand, the intensity of the existing mechanisms was reduced
because of cost reasons.
Behavior control was also reduced (C3, C8 and C11). Again this
was due to the fact that certain mechanisms of the previous phase
were abandoned. For example in C4 and C9 co-location of project
staff was not extensively required anymore.

Proposition 3: Changing team involvement requires changes in
the amount of formal and informal control
In some projects, the near-/ offshore teams were introduced later
in the project (e.g. C4, C10, and C11). In other projects, the
offshore teams were only marginally involved in the system
implementation phase (C6 and C8). This changing team
involvement required changes in the amount of formal and
informal control. For example, in C6 the offshore team was only
marginally involved in the system implementation phase. As a
result the control mechanisms were significantly reduced. Since

The amount of clan control decreased in four projects (C7, C8,
C10 and C11). This can be explained by the offshore sources not
being involved to a high extent in the last phase. Socializing and
co-location had no further use and thus, they were abandoned for
those cases. However, in other projects, the amount stayed on the
same level (C3, C4 and C7). The offshore sources were utilized in
these phases for (multiple) roll-outs of the software. For this
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no outcomes were delivered by the offshore team, no outcome
control was exercised at all. Communication with the Indian team
members took place on demand whenever issues arose and needed
clarification. This finding can partly be explained by prior
research stating that the choice of particular control mechanisms
further depends on the knowledge of the stakeholders as well as
the relationship between these stakeholders. Thus, with new team
members joining and pulling out of the project, knowledge of
controller and controlee and its relationships will change as well
[4].

amount of informal control seemed to be unrelated to those
emerging quality issues. In C2 and C3 the amount of informal
control remained on a similar level. The problems were instead
mitigated with the help of formal control. In C8 the amount of
control was slightly increased. This was done because the client
trusted the vendor to solve the issues himself. C11 showed an
increase of the amount of formal control after the problems
occurred, while the informal control was minimally decreased.
This was the result of the vendor trying to prevent direct
governance and control between the client and his offshore
sources.

Proposition 4: Trust between client an OSD provider leads to a
decrease of the amount of formal control and an increase in the
amount of informal control

Proposition 5c: Quality problems during the project lead to the
introduction of new control mechanisms

In particular, with new team members entering the project the
relationship between controller and controlee might evolve
towards a more trustful relationship [20]. Trust might lead to a
decrease of formal controls and an increase in informal controls
[20]. This became particularly evident in C11 where the vendor
shifted some of his Indian employees onsite for improving
communication and increasing productivity. During these team
member stays, socializing among offshore and onsite employees
was an important trust building mechanism and was facilitated in
particular during lunches or private conversations. Altogether trust
was built up, which in turn reduced the amount of formal control
in this project.

As described above, in some phases entirely new mechanisms are
introduced, whereas others are abandoned. A good example is the
usage of additional deliverable control mechanisms. In a few
cases the vendor was required to present prototypes for reviews
(C7, C8 and C12). Other examples of this practice include C2,
where additional new outcome control mechanisms were added,
such as preliminary deliverables, which were then pre-checked by
the client. As a result, due to poor quality of early deliverables the
intensity of outcome control increased significantly.
Proposition 6: Good quality of deliverables reduces the amount
of control
In a few cases (C3, C11) the quality of deliverables increased,
after having tackled the quality problems encountered in prior
phases. In general we found that the client reduced the amount of
control after the project was running smoothly. One possible
explanation for this is that the introduction of high amounts of
control will also increase the costs associated with these controls.
As soon as the project requires less attention, control is reduced
for saving costs. This relation could also be explained by an
increase of trust between client and vendor after the project was
running smoothly [1].

Proposition 5a: Quality problems during the project lead to an
increase of the amount of formal control
In total, four of the nine projects ran into quality problems during
the project (C2, C3, C8 and C11). These were mainly caused by
conflicting perceptions in quality or miscommunication. In some
projects deadlines elapsed without delivery of satisfactory results
from the vendor. As a result, the client increased the amount of
formal controls in all projects but C8. In C8 the client trusted the
vendor in solving the quality issues himself. While most clients
increased both outcome and behavior control (C2 and C3) one
client enhanced solely the amount of outcome control (C11).

Proposition 7: The amount of control is not directly related to
project success

This result is not surprising and various authors have argued that
project performance problems influence control [25, 20, 41].
Rustagi et al. [1] findings support the claim that task uncertainty
which may be caused by erratic quality is positively associated
with the total amount of formal control. Moreover, Heiskanen et
al. [32] investigated the influence of project performance
problems on outcome control. They found that when quality
problems arise, clients mitigate this by extending the amount of
outcome control. Sabherwal and Choudhury [21, 25] partly
support this finding as well. They found out that if problems arise,
the client usually introduces more behavior and clan control.
Interestingly, our data only supports a positive relationship
between project performance problems and behavior control but
not between project performance problems and clan control.

Finally, we made a more general observation, not necessarily
linked to the changes of the amount of control across project
phases – the link between the amount of control and project
success.
Project success was determined according to the method described
in section 2.4. The data indicates that there is no relation between
project success and control. For instance, project success in highly
controlled projects such as C1 and C10 was considered to be low
by the project managers. This finding contrasts previous research
[18, 33, 34, 42] that found a positive relation between control and
project success.
A possible explanation might be that projects with quality or
scope problems tend to exercise more formal control (see
proposition 5). If the project management cannot solve the quality
issues, the overall amount of control may remain on a high level.
Thus, despite a high amount of control, the desired project success
might not be achieved. Another interviewed manager (C9) stated
that by monitoring the vendor too closely, possible problems are
uncovered that would have remained undetected with low
amounts of control. These detected problems are usually solved
by the vendor before the deadlines and thus, they do not affect
project success that much. This rather surprising result should be
investigated further.

Proposition 5b: Quality problems during the project do not
necessarily lead to an increase of the amount of informal
control
Researchers have discussed the relationship between project
performance problems and control [25, 20, 41]. Sabherwal and
Choudhury [21, 25] stated that usually clan control is enhanced or
introduced when problems occur in a project. This relation is not
supported by our data. As described above, four projects ran into
quality problems (C2, C3, C8 and C11). However, in our cases the
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step would be to further refine some of these propositions and test
these with the help of a large-scale quantitative study.

6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
While prior research has investigated antecedents of control in
general, as well as the dynamics of control across project phases
[1, 21, 24, 25], there has been only very little research on the
dynamic changes in the variety and intensity of formal and
informal control mechanisms across different stages of OSD
projects. Thus, the unique contributions of this paper are (1) to
have provided further empirical work on the still neglected area of
‗amount of control‘, (2) to have taken on a dynamic perspective,
by investigating the amount of control across different project
phases, (3) to have identified important factors that trigger
changes in the amount of control in these phases, and finally (4) to
have challenged common assumptions that the amount of control
is directly related to project success [18, 33, 34, 42]. In particular
the latter is an important finding and suggests that this direct
relationship needs to be revisited as there might be mediation or
moderation effects responsible for these results.

Altogether, this study contributes to the further understanding of
the complex interplay between the amount of control, its
influencing factors and its relationship to project success.
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8. APPENDIX

Client

Project Characteristics

Client

Project Characteristics

432
> 20 Mio. Euro
Nearshore: Spain
Peak > 350 (Vendor: 110 onsite, > 100
nearshore)
3 years
Fix Price
Time
Expectations met: rather negative
Costs: negative
Timely Delivery: negative
Satisfaction: rather negative
rather negative

< 1 Mio. Euro
Offshore: India

30 (+ 4 project management + 4
employees from Client)

15 months
Fix Price
Quality
Expectations met: neutral
Costs: rather negative
Timely Delivery: rather negative
Satisfaction: neutral

neutral

service

rather positive

4,5 years
Time & Material (with cap)
Quality
Expectations met: rather positive
Costs: rather positive
Timely Delivery: rather positive
Satisfaction: positive

185 (Vendor: 100 onsite/ Nearshore,
25 offshore)

> 20 Mio. Euro
Offshore: India
Nearshore: Italy, Spain

Multinational

Vendor:
provider

Vendor: Multinational service provider

Case 11
Measurement Instruments
large
Switzerland
SAP implementation project (most
modules) with custom developments.

positive

Case 10

rather positive

neutral

3 years
Fix Price
None
Expectations met: rather positive
Costs: positive
Timely Delivery: positive
Satisfaction: rather positive

Telecommunication
large
Spain
Custom development and integration
of billing related systems

6 years
Time & Material
Quality
Expectations met: positive
Costs: rather positive
Timely Delivery: rather positive
Satisfaction: neutral

8 months
Fix Price
Quality
Expectations met: negative
Costs: rather positive
Timely Delivery: positive
Satisfaction: neutral

3,5

offshore
4 months
Fix Price
None
Expectations
met:
rather
positive
Costs: neutral
Timely Delivery: neutral
Satisfaction: positive
rather positive

4,5 (Vendor:
developers)

< 0.5 Mio. Euro
Nearshore: Tunisia

Vendor: Small, Tunisian offshore
provider with

Advertising
small
Dubai
Arabic web portal development
for commercial advertisements.

Case 12

rather positive

> 3 years
Time & Material
None
Expectations met: neutral
Costs: positive
Timely Delivery: neutral
Satisfaction: rather positive

Over 300 (around 2/3 offshore or
nearshore)

15 – 30 (onsite: 3 – 8 | nearshore: 12 –
22)

Captive: Subsidiary in India

for

> 5 Mio. Euro
Offshore: India
Nearshore: Eastern Europe

Case 8

600 (200 offshore, 100 nearshore)

around 75 (Vendor: 50 - 60 offshore |
Client: 15 - 20)

Case 6
Healthcare
large
Germany
Software
development
medical imaging software.

< 5 Mio. Euro
Nearshore: Slovakia

service

Chemical
medium
Germany
Development of a customized solution
for production control in the chemical
industry.
Vendor: Indian company with onsite
management team

> 20 Mio. Euro
Offshore: India | Nearshore: Southern
Europe

< 5 Mio. Euro
Offshore: India | Onsite: Germany

Multinational

Vendor:
provider

Vendor: Multinational service provider

Case 4
High Tech
large
Germany
B2B enterprise application integration,
migration and implementation project.

Telecommunication
large
UK
Global SAP rollout project with a high
degree of custom developments.

Apparel
large
Germany
Re-development
of
e-commerce
platform
with
enhancements
in
functionality.
Vendor: Indian based, multinational
service company

Table 2. Case overview
Case 3

Case 2

Case 7

1 year
Time & Material
None
Expectations
met:
rather
positive
Costs: negative
Timely Delivery: neutral
Satisfaction: neutral
Neutral

around 30 (7 nearshore, 23
onsite)

< 5 Mio. Euro
Nearshore: Poland

Software Engineering
Small
Germany
Development of an ajax, webbased
system
for
travel
businesses.
Captive: Subsidiary in Poland
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Amount

Requirements
Determination

System
Development

Overall Control Amount

System
Amount
Implementation

Amount

Project Phases

Case

Overall Control Amount

System
Amount
Implementation

Amount

System
Development

C8

n/a n/a n/a n/a

Outcome

Outcome

Amount

Behavior

Behavior

Requirements
Determination

Clan

Clan

Project Phases
Self

Self

Control
Amounts

Control
Amounts

C3
Behavior

Behavior

Outcome

Outcome

C10

Clan

Clan

C4
Behavior

Behavior

Outcome

Outcome

C11

Behavior

C12

C6

Behavior

Clan

Clan

Clan

Clan

C2

Self

Self

Outcome

Outcome

Self

Self

Self

Self

Case

C7

Clan

Table 3. Overview of the amounts of control across project stages
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